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PHARMACEUTICAL PHONIES: THE ENTANGLEMENT OF FRAUD, THIRD-PARTY PAYORS, 
AND PROXIMATE CAUSE IN CIVIL RICO CASES 
 
by: Merrick M. Hayashi* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Case Note analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s approach to the issue of whether patients and 
doctors destroy proximate cause in cases where third-party payors (“TPPs”) sue drug companies 
for fraudulently misrepresenting the health risks associated with their products. In the 2019 case 
Painters & Allied Trades District Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals Co., 
the Ninth Circuit held that TPPs suing to recover damages from a pharmaceutical company for the 
fraudulent omission of a drug’s health risks could satisfy the proximate cause requirement for a 
civil cause of action under § 1964(c) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“RICO”).1  
The Ninth Circuit’s decision is satisfactory in that it faithfully (1) observes the Supreme 
Court’s direct relation test and (2) follows precedent establishing that a plaintiff satisfies the 
proximate cause requirement when their alleged injury is a foreseeable and natural consequence 
of the defendant’s fraud. As a matter of public policy, this holding is positive because it hamstrings 
pharmaceutical companies’ ability to escape liability by hiding behind patients, doctors, and other 
actors inhabiting the chain of causation. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s holding is positive in 
that it adheres to Supreme Court precedent and helps deter future injurious conduct. 
 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V9.Arg.1 
* J.D. Candidate, Texas A&M University School of Law, May 2023; B.S. in Biochemistry, Baylor 
University, May 2018. The Author would like to thank his parents, Julia and Stuart Hayashi, for their continuous 
support. The Author would also like to thank Professor Brian Larson for his approachability, kindness, and diligence 
in helping the Author develop his legal writing skills. 
 
1 Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharms. Co., 943 F.3d 1243, 1260 (9th Cir. 
2019), writ denied, 141 S. Ct. 86 (2020); 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 
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 In support of these assertions, this Case Note begins by examining the factual background 
and procedural posture of Painters. The Note continues by analyzing the majority’s opinion with 
respect to related case law and closes by suggesting ways to address some of the potential 
problems that could stem from the Ninth Circuit’s decision. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF PAINTERS 
In 1999, Takeda Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Ltd., and 
Eli Lilly & Co. (“Defendants”) received approval from the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) for Actos, a drug designed to reduce blood sugar in type 2 diabetics.2 Over the next 
several years, Defendants marketed and sold Actos despite an accrual of data suggesting that the 
drug increased a patient’s risk of developing bladder cancer.3 Rather than heeding the data, 
Defendants refused to add a warning label to Actos or warn the public of its risk, opting instead to 
convince consumers that Actos did not predispose users to an increased likelihood of developing 
bladder cancer.4 
In September 2010, the FDA conducted a safety review of the drug’s alleged carcinogenic 
properties.5 Less than a year thereafter, the FDA issued an official warning to the public describing 
Actos’s potential link to bladder cancer in patients.6 In response, Defendants appended a warning 
label to Actos warning of its potential risks, resulting in an 80% decrease in sales.7 
In 2017, five diabetic patients (“Patients”), who took Actos, and Painters and Allied Trades 
District Council 82 Health Care Fund (“Painters Fund”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), a TPP that 
 
2 Id. at 1246. 
3 Id.  
4 Id. 
5 See id.  
6 Id. 
7 Id. 





reimburses members covered under its plan for medical and health expenses, brought a class action 
suit against Defendants in the Western District of Louisiana.8 They later transferred the case to the 
Central District of California.9 
Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants committed fraud by actively misleading doctors, patients, 
and TPPs into believing that Actos did not increase a user’s susceptibility to bladder cancer.10 In 
accordance with RICO § 1964(c), Plaintiffs sought to recover economic damages incurred by their 
purchases of Actos in reliance on Defendants’ false assertions.11 However, the court dismissed the 
case, stating that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that “Defendants’ acts and omissions were the 
proximate cause” of their economic loss.12 Plaintiffs subsequently appealed to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.13 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and found for Plaintiffs, reasoning 
that the proximate cause requirement described in § 1964(c) was satisfied because a direct 
relationship existed between Defendants’ fraud and the economic injury suffered by TPPs.14 The 
court explained that even though doctors prescribed the drug, their actions did not constitute an 
intervening cause because it was foreseeable that on account of the structure of the U.S. healthcare 
system, patients and TPPs would shoulder the economic losses.15 The court further provided that 
even though doctors served as intermediaries, “it was perfectly foreseeable that physicians who 
 
8 Id. at 1246–47. 
9 Id. at 1246. 
10 Id. at 1247. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 1247–48. 
13 Id. at 1248. 
14 Id. at 1259–60. 
15 Id. at 1257.  
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[prescribed] Actos would play a causative role in Defendants’ allegedly fraudulent scheme to 
increase Actos’s revenues,” meaning the chain of causation remained intact.16 
III. REVIEW OF RELEVANT CASE LAW 
To successfully establish a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must satisfy two requirements.17 
First, under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant participated “in 
the conduct of [their] enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.”18 Second, 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), the plaintiff must prove that they were “injured in [their] business or 
property by reason of [defendant’s] violation of section 1962.”19 
In Holmes v. Security Investor Protection Corp., the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase 
“by reason of” in § 1964(c) to mean that the defendant’s violation of § 1962 was the proximate 
cause of the plaintiff’s injury, adding there must reside “some direct relation between the injury 
asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”20 
To determine whether a “direct relation” existed between a defendant’s conduct and the 
plaintiff’s injury, the Court considered three factors: (1) the difficulty of determining “what 
damages are attributable to [d]efendants’ alleged RICO violation, as opposed to [independent 
intervening] factors”; (2) the risk of “duplicative recoveries by plaintiffs removed at different 
levels of injury from the violation”; and (3) “whether holding [d]efendants liable . . . justifies the 
general interest of deterring injurious conduct or whether there are more directly injured victims 
 
16 Id.  
17 Id. at 1248.  
18 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 
19 Id. § 1964(c). 
20 Holmes v. Secs. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992). 





we can count on to hold [d]efendants liable.”21 Although seemingly straightforward, courts are 
divided on how to apply these factors in cases involving TPPs and pharmaceutical companies.22 
The Second Circuit disfavors allowing recovery of economic damages by TPPs when the 
link “between the alleged misrepresentations . . . and the ultimate injury to the TPPs” is too 
attenuated.23 In UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., a class of TPPs sued a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer for misrepresenting the side effects of their drug Zyprexa.24 The plaintiffs alleged 
that they suffered economic injury because they otherwise would never have purchased the drug 
absent the defendant’s misrepresentations.25 The Second Circuit rejected this theory, holding that 
because the misrepresentations were not directed toward TPPs but rather doctors, who have 
independent knowledge of their patients and their own experience with Zyprexa, the defendant’s 
misrepresentations were “not . . . the only [or ultimate] source of information on which doctors 
based prescribing decisions,” thereby destroying proximate cause.26 
The Seventh Circuit similarly disfavors allowing recovery by TPPs when the link between 
the defendant’s misrepresentations and the plaintiff’s injury is too attenuated.27 In Sidney Hillman 
Health Center v. Abbott Laboratories, a class of TPPs sued a pharmaceutical manufacturer for 
concealing the harmful side effects of its drug from consumers.28 Relying on the same reasoning 
as the Second Circuit, the Seventh Circuit held that the harm TPPs suffered was too attenuated to 
satisfy proximate cause.29 However, the Seventh Circuit further rationalized its decision by 
explaining that TPPs were the inappropriate parties to bring a civil RICO claim because they were 
 
21 Id. at 269; Painters, 943 F.3d at 1251–52. 
22 Painters, 943 F.3d at 1253. 
23 See UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 134 (2d Cir. 2010). 
24 Id. at 129. 
25 Id. at 133.  
26 Id. at 135. 
27 See Sidney Hillman Health Ctr.  v. Abbott Lab’ys, 873 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2017). 
28 Id. at 575. 
29 Id. at 578. 
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“not the only, or even the most directly, injured parties” and because the “patients’ health and 
financial costs come first in line temporally.”30 
On the other hand, some courts reject the theory that intermediaries, like doctors and 
patients, eliminate proximate cause simply because they, rather than TPPs, were the ones who 
directly relied on a defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentations.31 
In In re Neurontin Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation, plaintiff Kaiser Foundation 
Health Plan (“Kaiser”), a TPP, sued defendant Pfizer, a pharmaceutical manufacturer, for 
fraudulently misrepresenting the drug Neurontin as an effective treatment for off-label uses.32 
When Pfizer moved to dismiss the case by arguing that too many steps occurred between its fraud 
and Kaiser’s injury to sustain proximate cause, the First Circuit remained unconvinced.33 The court 
held that because Pfizer specifically targeted Kaiser in its fraudulent marketing plans for Neurontin 
and knew, on account of the U.S. healthcare system, that TPPs like Kaiser would foot the cost of 
Neurontin, the chain of causation between Pfizer’s fraud and Kaiser’s economic injury remained 
intact.34 
The Third Circuit also rejected the idea that intermediaries destroy proximate cause.35 In 
In re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices & Product Liability Litigation, a class of TPPs sued a 
pharmaceutical company for misrepresenting the health risks associated with the drug Avandia.36 
The Third Circuit applied the direct relation test described in Holmes and held that the “conduct 
that allegedly caused [the] plaintiffs’ injuries is the same conduct forming the basis of the RICO 
 
30 Id. at 576. 
31 Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharms. Co., 943 F.3d 1243, 1255–56 (9th 
Cir. 2019), writ denied, 141 S. Ct. 86 (2020). 
32 In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2013). 
33 Id. at 38. 
34 Id. at 38–39. 
35 In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 645 (3d Cir. 2015). 
36 Id. at 636. 





scheme alleged in the complaint—the misrepresentation of the heart-related risks of taking 
Avandia that caused TPPs” to purchase the drug.37 The court also recognized that the TPP plaintiffs 
were the most appropriate party to sue the manufacturer because the injury they suffered “[was] 
an economic injury independent of any physical injury suffered by Avandia users” and 
“prescribing physicians did not suffer RICO injury” because of the defendant’s fraud.38   
 Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentations 
made to a third party do not necessarily destroy the chain of causation with the injured party.39 In 
Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., the plaintiffs, a class of bidders at a county tax lien 
auction, sued the defendant, another bidder, for fraudulently submitting affidavits to the 
auctioneers that were not in his own name, enabling him to secure a larger share of the tax liens.40 
The district court held for the defendant, claiming that the class of plaintiffs lacked standing 
because the fraudulent affidavits were made to the auction runners rather than the other bidders.41 
The parties appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which held for plaintiffs.42 The Supreme Court 
reasoned that the plaintiffs were the immediately injured party, their “alleged injury—the loss of 
valuable liens—[was] the direct result of [the defendants’] fraud[,]” and “[i]t was a foreseeable 
and natural consequence of [the defendants’] scheme to obtain more liens for themselves[.]”43 
  
 
37 Id. at 644. 
38 Id. 
39 Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 657–58 (2008). 
40 Id. at 643–44. 
41 Id. at 645. 
42 Id. at 646, 661. 
43 Id. at 658. 
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IV. CASE ANALYSIS 
A. Direct Relation Test 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision is correct in that it faithfully observes the direct relation test 
the Supreme Court unanimously expressed in Holmes. The direct relation test considers (1) the 
difficulty of attributing damages to defendants’ alleged RICO violation, as opposed to intermediate 
factors; (2) the risk of multiple recoveries by plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury; and 
(3) “whether holding [d]efendants liable” will deter injurious conduct or whether more 
immediately injured parties have better standing to bring a cause of action.44  
With respect to the first factor, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is correct because difficulties 
associated with attributing damages in civil RICO cases involving TPPs should not preclude a 
finding of proximate cause. Unlike the Second Circuit in UFCW, which expressed that it would be 
too difficult to determine damages attributable to the pharmaceutical companies’ fraud because 
prescribing doctors have independent knowledge regarding their patients and the drug’s 
effectiveness,45 the Ninth Circuit determined that this calculation was by no means impossible.46  
This holding is reasonable because, ostensibly, difficulty in attributing damages does not mean 
that it is impossible. More importantly, difficulty in attributing damages should by no means 
preclude a finding of proximate cause. This is especially true at the pleadings stage where 
discovery has not provided plaintiffs with a meaningful opportunity to gather information that 
could help them form a well-reasoned attribution of damages.  
Regarding the second factor, the Ninth Circuit’s holding is satisfactory because it correctly 
identified that the risk of duplicative recoveries in Painters was non-existent. Although there is 
 
44 Holmes v. Secs. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992); Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health 
Care Fund v. Takeda Pharms. Co., 943 F.3d 1243, 1252 (9th Cir. 2019), writ denied, 141 S. Ct. 86 (2020). 
45 UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 135 (2d Cir. 2010). 
46 Id.; Painters, 943 F.3d at 1258. 





worry about recognizing the claims of indirectly harmed parties due to confusing apportionment 
rules at different levels of removal from the harm, this concern is misplaced. The Supreme Court 
in Holmes never ranked the ability of one party to recover over the other based on differing levels 
of removal from the alleged harm.47 Rather, the Court only held that the parties could not recover 
more than once for the same harm.48 Thus, in this case, the Ninth Circuit did not violate precedent 
when it held that two distinct classes of plaintiffs, the patients and the TPPs, were entitled to 
damages for the same injury stemming from the same injurious act: the defendants’ fraud.49 A 
decision otherwise would set a harmful precedent whereby parties differently situated along the 
causal chain would be unable to recover damages stemming from the same harm, however slight 
the temporal or physical displacement between the parties might be. Such a holding would unfairly 
advantage one party’s right to recovery over the other for the same wrong due to circumstances 
beyond their control. 
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit’s decision faithfully adheres to the third factor of the direct 
relation test because holding the pharmaceutical companies liable under civil RICO claims would 
deter similar injurious conduct in the future. Although critics of the Ninth Circuit’s holding might 
argue that it goes too far by relaxing the proximate cause requirement, thereby opening the door 
to frivolous litigation, this concern as a matter of policy does not outweigh the dangers presented 
by letting pharmaceutical companies escape liability for such widespread fraudulent behavior. 
Additionally, while this case concerns purely economic injury, it is critical to remember that the 
defendants’ conduct likely afflicted the lives of countless people. In sum, even though the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision holds that TPPs can satisfy proximate cause under narrow circumstances, it will 
 
47 Painters, 943 F.3d at 1258. 
48 See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269 (holding that courts would need to adopt complicated rules to apportion damages 
amongst indirectly injured parties to prevent risk of multiple recoveries).  
49 Painters, 943 F.3d at 1260. 
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go a long way in deterring such conduct in the future by holding pharmaceutical companies 
accountable for the totality of wrongs, both economic and physical, stemming from their actions.  
B. The Foreseeable and Natural Consequence Doctrine 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision is satisfactory in that it adheres to the foreseeable and natural 
consequence doctrine expressed by the Supreme Court in Bridge. In UFCW, the Second Circuit 
held that, because the pharmaceutical companies directed their fraudulent statements toward 
physicians, the TPPs lacked standing to sue.50 However, this reasoning directly contradicts the 
Supreme Court’s unanimous holding in Bridge, which established that direct reliance on a 
defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentations is not necessary to denote proximate cause.51 Rather, 
the focus should be on whether the injury suffered by the plaintiffs was the foreseeable and natural 
consequence of the defendant’s fraud, regardless of whether the plaintiffs relied on it firsthand.52 
With Painters, the Ninth Circuit correctly applied this doctrine because TPPs almost invariably 
foot the cost of medications, meaning the defendants’ scheme would never have worked without 
their participation. In other words, the defendants in Painters were liable because the injury 
suffered by the TPPs was not only foreseeable and natural, but it was the outcome specifically 
desired by the pharmaceutical companies. 
Although proximate cause serves to discourage frivolous litigation and a direct reliance 
rule appears to further this principle, the Ninth Circuit’s decision to uphold proximate cause in 
Painters was correct because neither Supreme Court precedent nor the RICO statute stipulates 
direct reliance. If the Ninth Circuit were to uphold the theory of direct reliance, it would radically 
constrict the RICO statute’s “by reason of” requirement as injuries can, and often do, occur through 
 
50 UFCW, 620 F.3d at 136. 
51 Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 657–58 (2008). 
52 Id. 





intermediate parties. A holding by the Ninth Circuit otherwise would also restrict the ability of 
TPPs to recover for injuries deliberately inflicted upon them and encourage pharmaceutical 
companies to continue fraudulent behavior at the great cost of money and, more critically, human 
lives. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In holding that doctors and patients do not sever proximate cause in situations where TPPs 
buy fraudulently marketed drugs from pharmaceutical manufacturers, the Ninth Circuit has 
affirmed and strengthened the civil RICO statute while also faithfully adhering to Supreme Court 
precedent. As a matter of policy, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is positive in that it enables civil 
entities to hold enterprises liable more readily for generating revenue from lies. This will help deter 
future injurious conduct and tip the inter-court split over the proximate cause requirement of 18 
U.S.C. § 1964(c) in favor of the innocent, harmed parties. 
